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Recent Cases
ADOPIoN-DEsCENT AND DisTRIoUTIoN-ROHT ov ADoPTED CHmu
To TAxE FRom NATuRAL PARENT UNDER PERTERA E D Hsm STATT
Wailes v. Curators of Central College: In Re Furnis's Will
Can an adopted child in Missouri take by intestate descent from his natural
parents?2 The Revised Statutes provide as follows:
"453.090. Consequences of Adoption-1. When a child is adopted in accord-
ance with the provisions of this chapter, all legal relations and all rights and
duties between such child and his natural parents (other than a natural
parent who joins in the petition for adoption as provided in Section 435.010)
shall cease and determine. Said child shall thereafter be deemed and held to
be for every purpose the child of his parents or parents by adoption, as
fully as though born to them in lawful wedlock....
4. Said adopted child shall be capable of inheriting from and taking through
his parent or parents by adoption property limited expressly to heirs of the
body of such parent or parents by adoption." (Emphasis added) 3
Furnish and his wife willed the bulk of their estate to Central College. Their
natural grandchildren had been legally adopted by other couples under the provisions
of Section 453. These grandchildren, being omitted from the will of their natural
grandfather, claimed shares as pretermitted heirs.4 The circuit court held against the
College and in favor of the grandchildren,5 but the Supreme Court of Missouri en
banc, with but one dissent, reversed the circuit court and held that the statute meant
what it said and would be literally construed. This decision settled a question that
has been uncertain in Missouri for some time, and particularly so for the last eight
years.
In 1933, the Supreme Court of Missouri in Shepherd v. MurphyG held that the
statute rendered natural parents incapable of inheriting from the adopted child.
Although the court did not specifically pass upon the reverse situation of an adopted
child inheriting from his natural parents, the court did state that the statute cut all
1. 254 S.W. 2d 645 (Mo. 1953).
2. An adopted child "continues to inherit from all blood relatives in the absence
of a statute to the contrary, although he may be denied the right to inherit in a dual
capacity where the adoptive parent is a blood relative." 2 C.J.S., Adoption of Children,
§ 63, p. 454.
3. Mo. RPv. STAT. § 453.090 (1949).
4. Mo. REV. STAT. § 468.290 (1949), provides the right to an intestate
share to a child not named or provided for in the testators will. It has been held that
the present statute places the adopted child in line of descent from his adopted father
so that he may take from the adopted father as a pretermitted heir under this section.
Robertson v. Cornett, 359 Mo. 1156, 225 S.W. 2d 780 (1949).
5. There is an apparent error on page 654 of the Southwestern Reporter head-
note to this case: "The circuit court... entered judgment adverse to defendants who
were grandchildren of deceased, and those defendants appealed." Actually, judgment
in the circuit court was in favor of the natural grandchildren. The adverse judgment
probably intended to refer to Central College which was joined as a defendant.
6. 332 Mo. 1176, 61 S.W. 2d 746 (1933).
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ties between the adopted child and its natural parents "for every purpose." The
language of part of the decision is not unlike that of the principal case.
In 1945, however, in St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Kaltenbach,7 the court allowed
the "adopted" child to inherit from his natural parent, the decision being based upon
a finding that the adoption was defective and illegal in that no notice of adoption was
served upon the natural parent, nor any guardian ad litem appointed to represent
the child. Based upon such a finding, the decision would not seem to contradict the
Shepherd case; however, the court added the following dictum: ".... it [the adoption
statute] does not say that the adopted child is rendered incapable of inheriting from
its natural parents."8
Five years later, in Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Palms,9 the court allowed
three of testator's natural children, who had been adopted under the statute, to
take under a will creating seven equal parts of a residuary estate for each of his
seven children. The present statute does not, of course, bar leaving property to
natural children by will; but the court added this statement: ".... in Missouri the
legislature has not said that one who has been adopted by another shall not inherit
from his natural parents.'
There is, moreover, a background of early cases evidencing the court's natural
and understandable reluctance to sever the last bond between natural parent and
child. Clarkson v. Hatton,1O for example, supported inheritance from both natural
and adopted parents. This case, however, as well as all other pre-1917 cases are of little
significance today since they were decided before the establishment in 1917 of a
comprehensive statutory scheme of adoption."1
Despite the background of these early cases and the possibly misleading dictum
of the later cases, the court in the principal case found the language of the legislature
too plain to allow exception. The court refused, in effect, to construe "all rights" to
mean "all but one."12 Adoption is purely statutory,13 as is the law of descent,' 4 and
there is no absolute or natural right to inherit from one's natural parents. There is
no reason, therefore, to alter the clear wording of the statute by judicial construction.
7. 353 Mo. 1114, 186 S.W. 2d 578 (1945).
8. This dictum is criticized by Cook and Eppenberger in The New Adoption Act,
4 J. Mo. BAR 228, 231 (Sept. 1948). "In our opinion Section 9614, both new and old,
clearly destroys all inheritance rights of the adopted child as to its natural parents,
and the dictum of the court to the contrary was unfortunate and certainly unneces-
sary to the decision. Our Missouri Adoption Code purports to change the blood
stream of the adopted child; certainly inheritance from 2 sets of parents should not be
countenanced."
9. 360 Mo. 610, 229 S.W. 2d 675 (1950).
10. 143 Mo. 47, 44 S.W. 761, 39 L.R.A. 748 (1898).
11. Prior to 1917, a child could be adopted by deed in a manner similar to the
conveyance of real estate. All the existing laws on adoption were repealed in 1917,
and a statutory system set up which has continued to the present day with minor
amendments in 1941, 1943, and 1945.
12. Incidentally, House Bill 120, § 10 (1947), which would have given adopted
children a right to inherit from natural parents, failed to pass.
13. Beach v. Bryan, 155 Mo. App. 33, 133 S.W. 635 (1911); Lamb v. Freehan, 276
S.W. 71 (1925); In re Watson's Adoption, 238 Mo. App. 1104, 195 S.W. 2d 331 (1946).
14. Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 62 Sup. Ct. 398, 86 L.Ed. 542, 137 A.L.R.
1093 (1942); Robertson v. Cornett, 359 Mo. 1156, 225 S.W. 2d 780 (784-5) (1949).
1954]
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Moreover, the court declared the public policy of the state to be against dual inher-
itance from both the natural and the adoptive parents. This seems sound when one
realizes that the purpose of the adoption is to give the adopted child the same status
as other children, and not a special status involving an additional inheritance. The
procedure provided by the Missouri statute appears adequate to prevent the use of
adoption to fraudulently deprive the child of the natural inheritance, a fear which
has been the basis of some of the arguments against complete severance.
The decision is welcomed for two reasons-it settles the question raised by the
cases cited, and it places Missouri among the increasing number of modern courts that
view adoption as a real transplanting of the child from the bloodstream of the
natural parents to that of the adoptive parents, a concept that has found favor in
other fields than law.
RA rmo C. LRvis, JR.
CONTRACS-CoIONAL AcC=ANCE OF ANTicIPAT Y REPUDiATIoN
United States v. Seacoast Gas Co.1
The defendant, Seacoast Gas Company, was supplying gas to a federal housing
project under a contract with the plaintiff, the United States, running from April 15,
1947, to June 15, 1948. On October 7, 1947, defendant notified plaintiff of its intention
to cancel the contract as of November 15, 1947. Immediately plaintiff notified
defendant that it would advertise for bids to complete the contract. On November 6,
1947, plaintiff received a low bid from Trion Company and notified defendant that
unless they received a written withdrawal of the cancellation notice within three days,
the bid would be accepted. Defendant did not respond, and the bid was accepted on
November 10 and contract negotiations begun. Thereafter, on November 13, defendant
retracted its notice of cancellation. The formal contract between Trion and plaintiff
was signed November 17. Plaintiff sued to collect the price in excess of the original
contract. On the ground that the defendant had withdrawn Its notice of cancellation
prior to the rendering of the contract with Trion, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia gave judgment for the defendant.
The Court of Appeals in the present case reversed the judgment stating that "In
fact and in law, when the government took bids and notified Seacoast that unless it
retracted within three days it would proceed to accept the Trion bid and award the
contract to it, the locus poenitentiae ended with these three days," Hence, the court
reasoned, defendant's retraction of its cancellation notice came too late.
The court added "All that is required to close the door to repentance is definite
action indicating that the anticipatory breach has been accepted as final, and this
requisite can be supplied either by the filing of a suit or a firm declaration, as
here, that unless within a fixed time the breach is repudiated, it will be accepted."2
The doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract, as first recorded in the English
1. 204 F. 2d 709 (5th Cir. 1953).
2. An alternative ground for the decision in the principal case was that the
acceptance by the plaintiff of the bid of Trion company on November 10 was a
sufficient change of position to prevent repentance by defendant on November 13.
3
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case of Hochster v. De La Tour,3 has been accepted almost unanimously in the
United States following Roehm v. Horst,4 decided in 1900 by the Supreme Court.
The rule states that if an absolute and unequivocal renunciation of a contract
is made by a promisor, before the time for full performance has arrived, the promisee
may elect to (1) rescind the contract, with the consequence that he would thereafter
be limited to the remedy of an action for restitution, or (2) ignore the repudiation
entirely, or (3) treat the renunciation as an immediate breach of the contract with
all the consequences that ensue from that situation.5 The repudiation standing alone
does not constitute a breach of the contract, but becomes so only when and if the
promisee in a proper manner recognizes the repudiation as a breach. 6
However, the repudiator may repent and withdraw his notice of repudiation
under certain circumstances, thus restoring the contract to its former status. The
Restatement of Contracts states "The effect of repudiation is nullified (a) where
statements constituting such a repudiation are withdrawn by information to that
effect given by the repudiator to the injured party before he has brought an action on
the breach, or has otherwise materially changed his position in reliance on them... T
However, many jurisdictions follow a "termination theory", under which, in addition
to the two methods of barring retraction permitted by the Restatement, a promisee
may end the locus poenitentiae merely by stating that he has accepted the repudiation
as a breach, without bringing an action or changing his position. The repudiation is
recognized as an "offer to terminate" and the promisee accepts this offer by treating
the renunciation as a breach.3
In addition to the above methods recognized by the courts following the
"termination theory", the principal case presents a fourth possibility, what may be
called termination by a "conditional acceptance" of an anticipatory repudiation. The
promisee states that the renunciation by the promisor will be accepted as a breach if
the promisor fails to retract his declaration within the time specified for that purpose
by the promisee. The expiration of the specified time without more, presumably, bars
retraction. The court in the instant case advanced the "conditional acceptance"
3. 2 El. & B1. 678, 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (QB. 1853).
4. 178 U.S. 1, 44 LEd. 953 (1900).
5. Frost v. Knight, L.R. 7 Ex. 111 (1872); Hochster v. De La Tour, supra.
6. WmrusToN oi CoNTRACTs § 1322 at p. 3722 (1937). The fact that the promisee
has requested continued performance after the repudiation does not affect his right at
a later date to sue for the breach. Bu-Vi-Bar Petroleum Corp. v. Krow, 40 F. 2d 488
(8th Cir. 1930); 69 A.L.R. 1295, 1304 (1930); RESTATEmENT, CoNimcTs § 320 (1932).
7. RESTATnNT, CoNTRAcTs § 319 (1932). See Vold, Withdrawal of Repudiation
After Anticipatory Breach of Contract, 5 TEx. L. Rev. 9 (1926). Decisions following
are Alderson v. Houston, 154 Cal. 1, 96 Pac. 884 (1908); Clover Mfg. Co. v. Austin, 101
Conn. 208, 125 Atl. 646 (1924); Alvey-Ferguson Co. v. Tosetti Co., 178 M. App. 536
(1913); Perkins v. Frazer, 107 La. 390, 31 So. 773 (1901); Bernstein v. Meech, 130 N.Y.
354, 29 N.E. 255 (1891); Clavan v. Hermann, 285 Pa. 120, 131 AUt. 705 (1926).
8. Mutual Loan Society v. Stowe, 15 Ala. App. 293, 73 So. 202 (1916); Quarton
v. American Law Book Co., 143 Ia. 517, 528, 121 N.W. 1009, 1013 (1909); Paducah
Cooperage Co. v. Arkansas Stove Co., 193 Ky. 774, 237 S.W. 413 (1922); Louisville
Packing Co. v. Craine, 141 Ky. 379, 132 S.W. 575 (1910); Haddaway v. Smith, 277 S.W.
728 (Tex. 1925); Swiger v. Hayman, 56 W. Va. 123, 48 S.E. 839 (1904). See Rothschild,
Anticipatory Contract Repudiation and Nullification-State and Federal Courts, 31
IA. L. REv. 383 (1946).
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possibility when it stated that the locus poenitentiae for the defendant ended with the
three days mentioned by the plaintiff.
In Louisville Packing Co. v. Craine,9 the plaintiff had repudiated his contract
with the defendant. Defendant then wrote that unless plaintiff withdrew the renun-
ciation in the "next few days", the claim would be put in the hands of a lawyer.
Three months later, and before the claim was assigned for collection, plaintiff re-
tracted. Retraction was disallowed, although following the repudiation defendant
had not changed his position, nor brought suit, nor declared an unconditional termina-
tion of his obligation. In so holding, the court permitted defendant's "conditional
acceptance" take effect upon the expiration of the time specified (i.e., "next few
days").
In opposition to the principal case and Louisville Packing Co. v. Craine, is
Southern Sawmill Co. v. Herzfeld,1o decided by the Georgia court in 1926. The
vendee of a lumber contract anticipatorily breached his agreement, whereupon ven-
dor wrote that unless vendee sent shipping instructions in three days, other offers for
the lumber would be accepted and vendee held liable for damages. Suit was
brought by vendor a month and a half later. Facts showing that vendee withdrew
his renunciation before suit was brought are not present in the report, but language
used in the decision indicates that they were inadvertently omitted.
".... where, as here, the seller did not elect to act upon such anticipatory
breach by bringing suit for such damages as may have accrued and where
there is proof indicating that, pending the date set for final performance,
the buyer withdrew his renunciation and announced his readiness to accept
the goods it became incumbent upon the seller to comply with his own obliga-
tions under the contract by tendering the goods .... 11
The court held the defendant vendee not liable. The "conditional acceptance"
of the anticipatory repudiation, without more, was inoperative to bar retraction of
the repudiation. This case seems to say that a "conditional acceptance" as such will
be given no effect; only if the promisee declares anew his acceptance of the repudia-
tion unconditionally will retraction be disallowed.
Under the Restatement theory, the problem does not arise, as a mere statement
of acceptance of a repudiation, whether conditional or unconditional, will never
operate to prevent the wrongdoer from retracting.12
A question arises as to whether the Georgia law embraces the Restatement view
or the "termination theory." A close reading of the Southern Sawmill case will show
that it cannot be said definitely whether that court is accepting the Restatement
theory, or the "termination theory" while denying effect to vendor's "conditional
acceptance". Other cases from that state shed no light on the question, as some decide
9. 141 Ky. 379, 132 S.W. 575 (1910).
10. 35 Ga. App. 206, 132 SE. 264 (1926). The case refers to and includes Herzfeld
v. Southern Sawmill Co., 31 Ga. App. 323, 120 S.E. 666 (1923) where the facts are set
out.
11. At page 265.
12. Clavan v. Hermann, 285 Pa. 120, 131 Atl. 105 (1926). REsTATEDuET, CoNTPACTS
§ 319 (1932). See WLIaSTON oN CoNMcTs § 1323 at 3723.
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a mere declaration of acceptance of the repudiation is sufficient,13 while another
requires that something more must be done by the promisee, such as bringing suit
or changing his position.14
STPm E. STROM
LIBEL Am SLA DER-CALLING ONE A COmUNsT SLANDER PER SE
Lightfoot v. Jennings'
After a public meeting in the court house, the defendant approached the plaintiff
who was then talking to a group of people and said, "you are not going to talk here
you damned communist." The plaintiff contended in his petition, that those words
were slanderous per se in that they meant, and were understood to mean that he was
a member of the communist party and, as such, advocated the forceable overthrow
of the government, a crime under the laws of the United States. 2 The trial court
sustained a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. Held: reversed
and remanded.3
The question of calling one a communist has most often arisen in cases of libel.
Most of the cases cited in the opinion deal with libel, and the two AJL.R. annotations4
referred to do not contain a case where calling one a communist was held slanderous
per se.5. The slander cases cited by the court 6 were disposed of on the ground that
such a charge did not injure one in his business or profession. The plaintiff in the
instant case did not claim that he had been injured in his business or profession, but
contended that he had been charged with the commission of a crime punishable by
imprisonment. Otherwise, he would have had to allege special damages to recover
for the slander.
13. Borochoff v. William Muirhead Const. Co., 56 Ga. App. 519, 193 S.E. 118
(1937); Smith v. Georgia Loan, Savings and Banking Co., 113 Ga. 975, 39 S.E. 410
(1901).
14. Byrd Printing Co. v. Whitaker Paper Co., 135 Ga. 865, 70 S.E. 798 (1911).
1. 254 S.W. 2d 596 (Mo. 1953).
2. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2385 (1948).
3. Mo. REV. STAT. § 559.400 (1949), provides that "Every person who shall falsely
and maliciously charge . . .any .. .person . . .with any felony, the commission of
which would subject such person to disfranchisment and other degrading penalties,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor."
4. 51 A.L.R. 1071 (1927); 171 A.L.R. 709 (1947).
5. However the following cases were cited where it was held slander per se:
Devany v. Quill, 187 Misc. 698, 64 N.Y.S. 2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (to call one "The
agent of Fasciasm in America today"); Von Gerichten v. Seitz, 94 App. Div. 130, 87
N.Y. Supp. 968 (4th Dep't 1940) (to say "you are an anarchist"). The following cases
were cited where it was held libelous to name one as a Red, Communist, Russian
agent, etc.: Wright v. Farm Journal, 158 F. 2d 976 (2nd Cir. 1947); Washington Times
Co. v. Murry, 55 App. D. C. 32, 299 Fed. 903 (D.C. 1924); Gallagher v. Chavalas, 48
Cal. App. 2d 52, 119 P. 2d 408 (1941); Kaminsky v. American Newspapers, 283 N.Y.
748, 28 N.E. 2d 971 (1940).
6. Pecyk v. Semoncheck, 105 N.E. 2d 61 (Ohio App. 1952); Keefe v. O'Brien, 203
Misc. 113, 116 N.Y.S. 2d 286 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
1954] RECENT CASES
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The distinction between libel and slander is well established. 7 An utterance is
slanderous per se when it: (1) imputes some offensive or loathsome disease,S (2)
imputes a charge of some crime punishable by imprisonment,9 or (3) tends to injure a
person in his trade or business.10 A fourth classification is sometimes added.11 A
writing is libelous per se if it exposes one to hatred, contempt, or ridicule.12 The
reasons for the difference between the two offenses are, among others, that libel is
thought to be more widely disseminated, more permanent of record and more likely
to do damage than slander.'5 That this is not true in every case has caused some
courts14 and many students of the law15 to express displeasure with the policy of
7. See RFsTATMnwTr, TORTS § 568 (1938); PROSSER, TORTS § 92 (1941); COOLEY,
TORTS § 111 (1907). This distinction seemingly arose in the court of the Star Chamber
with the advent of printed material, Fisher, The History of the Law of Libel, 10 L.Q.
REV. 158 (1894). According to 1 STRErT, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LmniLrry, p. 291-2
(1906), the offenses were first distinguished in civil cases in 1670.
8. Sally v. Brown, 220 Ky. 576, 295 S.W. 890 (1927) (said plaintiff was "eat up
with the clap"); Goldsmith v. Unity Industrial Life Insurance and Sick Benefit Ass'n,
13 La. App. 448, 128 So. 182 (1930) (charging plaintiff with syphilis); Kirby v. Smith,
54 S. D. 608, 224 N.W. 230 (1929) (charging one with tuberculosis is actionable per se).
9. Tincher v. National Life and Accident Ins. Co., 235 Mo. App. 663, 146 S. W. 2d
663 (1941) (accusing person of practicing medicine without a license); Stidham v.
Wachtel, 2 Terry 327, 21 A. 2d 282 (Del. 1941) (called plaintiff " a damned dirty
embezzler"). This case also contains a very concise discussion of damages to be
awarded in slander cases. Safeway Stores v. Rogers, 186 Ark. 826, 56 S.W. 2d 429
(1933) (plaintiff charged with stealing a can of pineapple); Nardyz v. Fulton Fire
Ins. Co., 151 Kan. 907, 101 P. 2d 1045 (1940) (accused of burning up his own barn to
defraud insurance company).
10. Randall Dairy Co. v. Pevely Dairy Co., 274 Ill. App. 474 (1934) (alleging
dairy sold watered milk); Mulcahy v. Deitrick, 39 Ohio App. 65, 176 N.E. 481 (1931)
(averring that teacher plays for dances and then goes to sleep in the schoolroom);
Hayner v. Cowden, 27 Ohio St. 292, 22 Am. Rep. 303 (1875) (imputing drunkenness
to a clergyman); Krcisuhaar v. Craig La Vin, 181 Misch. 508, 42 N.Y.S. 2d 857 (Sup.
Ct. 1943) (statement that attorney was "unethical").
11. In some jurisdictions, although not at common law, alleging unchastity is
regarded as slander per se. Biggerstaff v. Zimmerman, 108 Colo. 194, 114 P. 2d 1098
(1941) ("To adopt this common law rule in Colorado would be invoking an anarch-
ronism inconsistent with our social and political concepts as reflected in the laws
and constitution of our state. Whether the slanderous words alleged constitute a
crime under our laws it is unnecessary to decide."): Ventresca v. Kissner, 105 Conn.
533, 136 At. 90 (1927) (claiming plaintiff is "a bad woman"); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §
574 (1939). However calling one a "bastard" does not impute unchastity to her and
thus is not actionable. Halliday v. Cienkowski, 333 Pa. 123, 3 A. 2d 372 (1939).
12. Thorley v. Lord Kerry, 4 Taunt. 355, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (1812); 17 AimA r L.
REv. 305 (1953). In accord is CooLEy, TORTS § 112 (1907) who adds that they include
all cases "which would be actionable per se if made orally."
13. Hartmann v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.. 2d 30 (1947); Ostrove v. Lee, 256
N.Y. 36, 175 N.E. 505 (1931) ("Many things that are defamatory may be said with
impunity through the medium of speech. Not so, however, when speech is caught
upon the wing and transmitted into print. What gives the sting to the writing is its
permanence in form."); HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAWV p. 365 (1926); 1 STRMET,
FOumATIONS OF LEGAL LmInnaAr pp. 291-5 (1906).
14. Devany v. Quill, 187 Misc. 698, 64 N.Y.S. 2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 1946) ("Why
written defamation of a candidate for public office should be deemed libel per se and
oral defamation should not be regarded as slander per se is not easy to perceive. The
natural . .. tendency to harm .. . is the same in both cases.") In Louisiana the
distinction has been rejected; and oral defamation is dealt with on the same principles
as written defamation. Feliman v. Dreyfour, 47 La. Ann. 907, 17 So. 422 (1895).
15. See PROSssER, TORTS, p. 807-809 (1941).
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distinguishing between the two offenses. In Missouri the distinction is well recog-
nized,1 6 and although this court refers to and cites many libel cases, there is no
thought expressed to merge the two, or attribute to one tort the elements of the other.
In the early common law, imputations of objectionable political principles were
considered defamatory. 17 The word "communist" today carries with it a derogatory
connotation and can do extensive damage.18 It is obvious that calling one a com-
munist does not attribute to one a loathsome or contagious disease, or unchastity.
Whether or not it injuries him in his business depends on the type of work he is in.' 9
The question before the Missouri court was: does it charge him with the commission
of an indictable crime? Is being a Communist a crime under the United States
Code? 20 Not necessarily. In the case of United States -v. Foster2l this question was
directly before the court. The defendant was tried for organizing the Communist
Party for the purpose of teaching and advocating the forceable overthrow of the
Government. He contended that the changes he sought to bring about were by
peaceful means. The court said that if the jury found from the evidence "that the
defendant organized ... the Communist Party as a legitimate political party solely
with the view of electing candidates to political office by lawful and peaceful
means"22 then he was entitled to a verdict of "not guilty". Since the statute requires
that one do the forbidden act "knowingly or willfully" the defendant would not be
"guilty merely by reason of the fact that he is a member of the Communist Party of
the United States of America, no matter what.., were the principles and doctrines
16. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 559.400, 559.410 (1949). But see Creekmore v. Rummels,
359 Mo. 1020, 224 S.W. 2d 1007 (1949), 15 Mo. L. Rzv. 472 (1950).
17. Lewis v. Coke, Cro. Jac. 424, 79 Eng. Rep. 362 (1617) ("Thou hast committed
treason beyond the seas"); Stapleton v. Frier, Cro. Eliz. 251, 78 Eng. Rep. 506 (1591)
("He had consented to the late rebels of the north").
18. In a poll taken, 40.2% of those questioned would prohibit communism as a
subject and 40% would prohibit communist speakers. 21 Fortune, Feb. 1940, p. 136.
When asked; "Would you say that the communist in America are composed of mostly
good and intelligent people, or half good and half bad people, or mostly bad and mis-
guided people?" 55.6% answered "Mostly bad and misguided people". 43.4% recom-
mended "drastic action". "Communist ranked lowest among 22 real and fictitious
party names in the order of being "liked" as a term in 22 Pennsylvania counties
where 55.5% of those tested were found to have "radical" views. 7 J. SocU-M PSYCHOL.
336, 354 (1936).
19. Such a charge was held to injure one in his business in Levy v. Gelber, 175
Misc. 746, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 148 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (lawyer); Contra; Krumbolz v. Raffer, 195
Misc. 788, 91 N.Y.S. 2d 743 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (business manager of a union); Gross v.
Mallamud, 200 Misc. 5, 108 N.Y.S. 2d 822 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (statements made at a high
school's Parents' Association meeting); Keefe v. O'Brien, 203 Misc. 113, 116 N.Y.S. 2d
286 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (of a union official, "It is far better, therefore, to allow free play
of our emotions rather than seal the lips of people who might be frightened into
silence and suppression lest use of the word "communism" should per se force them
costly litigation.")
20. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1948) provided that "whoever knowingly or willfully
advocates.., the ... propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the
United States ... shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than
ten years, or both."
21. 9 F.R.D. 367 (S.D. N.Y. 1949).
22. Id. at 381.
1954]
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which were taught or advocated by that party."23 He must have the requigite intent.
So it would seem that being a Communist may or may not be a crime, depending on
the type of Communism the person believes in. Which type of communist was plain-
tiff in this case charged as being? The court seems to say that this is a question of
fact for the jury.
The fact that this is a federal crime, and not a crime under the state laws, is of no
significance, since it imputes to one the commission of a crime in Missouri punish-
able by imprisonment.2 4
The court was careful to point out that the decision reached at the present time
might not be a precedent for a later case. What words are actionable per se "depends,
among other factors, upon the temper of the times, the current of contempory public
opinion, with the result that words, harmless in one age, in one community, may be
highly damaging to reputation at another time or in a different place."2 5 Thus the
fact that calling one a communist now is considered slanderous per se does not mean
that the same result will hold true a few years from now. Politics, allies, and pre-
judices change with the times. It is essential that the law be flexible enough to
change also.
THoAAs G. SmoNG
TORTs-LIABILrTY ol OccuPIER To CHIIREN TREsPAssERs FoR DYNAmm
CAPs L=rT "ABANDoNED"
Boyer v. Guidicy Marble, Terrazzo & Tile Co.1
Defendant owned and operated a rock quarry and, in the operation thereof,
possessed and used dynamite caps which were dangerous and so known to defendant.
Defendant permitted some of the caps to be left in a "thrown away" or "abandoned"
condition on his land near the quarry, and in a place frequented by children. Plaintiff
and his companion, 17 and 13 years of age, happened upon the caps while obviously
trespassing, took some of them not realizing them to be dangerous, and stuck a nail
into one causing it to explode, resulting in serious injuries to the plaintiff. The circuit
court dismissed the plaintiff's petition. On plaintiff's appeal, the lower court's decision
was reversed and remanded.
The Missouri Supreme Court denied the application of the "attractive nuisance"
23. Id. at 392. See also United States v. Dennis, 183 F. 2d 201 (2nd Cir. 1950)
which is in accord with this case.
24. See Bundy v. Hart, 46 Mo. 460 (1870) (plaintiff was accused of burning a
barn in Indiana).
25. Lightfoot v. Jennings, 254 S.W. 2d 596 at 599.
1. 246 S.W. 2d 742 (Mo. 1952).
9
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1954
1954] RECENT CASES 95
doctrine as applied in Missouri because of the requirement under our doctrine that
the "nuisance" must attract the child before the child becomes a trespasser.2 The
court realized that other jurisdictions giving broader interpretation of the doctrine
have considered similar cases within the attractive nuisance doctrine,3 but our court
has been hesitant in expanding the scope of the "turntable doctrine", as have many
jurisdictions which have adopted it.4 However, the court made an exception, other
than the attractive nuisance doctrine, to the ordinary duty of an occupier to tres-
passers, that being: one who uses extremely dangerous explosives is under a duty to
use the care that a reasonable, prudent man would use in handling, using, and main-
taining them.5 This duty is imposed especially where children are involved even
though they are trespassers. Although the court realized the foundation that foots this
exception is similar to that supporting the attractive nuisance doctrine (willingness
to give added protection to trespassers to immature years and understanding), it
expressly denies that the exception is part of that doctrine.6 Instead the court applies
the analysis of negligence-a duty is imposed to use care in regard to the explosives,
to leave them laying about carelessly violates that duty, and therefore an action for
common law negligence lies. 7 However unwilling to extend the doctrine of attractive
nuisance to include those instances, which are many, where children are trespassing
frequently upon an occupier's land and while so trespassing notice articles (here,
explosives) which arouse their interest and cause them harm (here by exploding), the
court is motivated by the same considerations upon which the attractive nuisance
doctrine is grounded. Thus, another inroad has been made into the non-liability of
such occupiers to trespassing children by enlarging the ordinary duty of precaution
2. Id. at 745, col. 1. "The fact that the attractive nuisance caused the original
trespass is an essential prerequisite to the invocation of the 'attractive nuisance'
doctrine in Missouri. ' Citing: Holifield v. Wigdor, 361 Mo. 636, 641, 235 S.W. 2d 564,
567 (1951); State ex rel. W. E. Callahan Const. Co. v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 1209, 1215, 159
S.W. 2d 251, 254 (1941); Hull v. Gillioz, 344 Mo. 1227, 1235, 1236, 130 S.W. 2d 623, 627,
628 (1939).
3. Id. at 745, col. 2, citing exhaustive annotation in 10 A.L.R. 2d 22 (1950).
4. 65 C.J.S., Negligence, § 29 (14), p. 479 ("Even in jurisdictions where the
attractive nuisance doctrine has been accepted, the tendency is to limit rather than
extend it, and the doctrine is said to be one which should be applied very cautiously
and only when the facts come strictly and fully within the rule.")
5. Boyer v. Guidicy, supra at 745, col. 2. See also: Kennedy v. Independent
Quarry and Const. Co., 316 Mo. 782, 790, 291 S.W. 475, 477 (1926).
6. Ibid.
7. In other cases cited in the opinion, it is found that the defendant is held liable
on this theory of duty and consequent breach. Kansas City ex rel. Barlow v.
Robinson, 322 Mo. 1050, 1059, 17 S.W. 2d 977, 981, col. 1 (1929) ("It is the general rule
of law that to leave exposed and unguarded, on accessible premises, an explosive
which is found by trespassing children is negligence"); Diehl v. A. P. Green Fire
Brick Co., 299 Mo. 641, 253 S.W. 984 (1923).
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owed them. Other jurisdictions have generally allowed recovery in similar cases, but
have done so on varying theories.8
Therefore, irrespective of the legal theory by which they reach their decisions,
courts allow a child-plaintiff to recover even though he is a trespasser, and even
though he was not "invited" to trespass by the dangerous instrumentality while he
was still in a place where he had a right to be. Both the courts allowing such cases
under attractive nuisance, and those allowing it under the exception of a dangerous
explosive, proceed upon the same general reasons: that children are readily attracted
to and do tamper with explosives, unmindful of the danger; that the occupier could or
should have known they would likely be on his land, even though as trespassers, and
that he therefore owned them a duty of protection commensurate with the risk in-
volved in his use of the explosives; and that by allowing children to get to and play
with such explosives so that harm to them is practically inevitable, he makes himself
liable for such consequent injury. ROBERT S. GAIDNEr
8. Alligator Co. v. Dutton, 109 F. 2d 900, 904 (8th Cir. 1940), proceeding under
Missouri law, in a case involving a child's trespass where the nuisance, a highly
inflammable waste product, attracted the child after he had become a trespasser,
decided that it makes little difference to the outcome whether the case is decided upon
attractive nuisance grounds or upon pure negligence grounds, citing a Missouri case
in which, it was observed, the court did not discuss the "refinement of legal theory,"
meaning the difference between the grounds. However, although it may not be too
clear, the Missouri case, Kansas City ex rel. Barlow v. Robinson, supra, note 7, seems
to be predicated on ordinary negligence. THE RESTATmENT, TORTS, § 339, makes no
requirement that the child be attracted to the harmful instrument before the trespass
begins, and thus would extend the doctrine to include the instant case.
Several jurisdictions, although accepting the doctrine of attractive nuisance, limit
recovery on that doctrine if the child was a trespasser before he was attracted by the
instrumentality, but allow a recovery because of the increased duty, such as Missouri
imposes. Luhman v. Hoover, 100 F. 2d 127 (6th Cir. 1940), under Indiana law; Hayko
v. Colorado and Utah Coal Co., 77 Colo. 143, 235 Pac. 373, 39 A.L.R. 482 (1925); Mati-
jevich v. Dolese & Shepard Co., 261 M. App. 498 (1931); Le Duc v. Detroit Edison Co.,
254 Mich. 86, 235 N.W. 832 (1931); Smith v. Smith-Peterson Co., 56 Nev. 79, 45 P. 2d
785, 100 AL.R. 440 (1935). However, 38 ADT. Jun, Negligence, § 153, p. 822, thinks
that the fact that the instrumentality is discoverable only after the trespass starts
only comes to bear in deciding whether or not children are likely to trespass; there-
fore, in a case where the occupier knows they frequently trespass, there is no need
for that requirement.
A great many jurisdictions simply call similar cases an exception to the ordinary
occupier's liability to trespassers, based on added duty to children due to the great
risk of harm provided by the explosives. Kingsland v. Erie County Agricultural Soc.,
298 N.Y. 409, 84 N.E. 2d 38, 10 A.L.R. 2d 1 (1949); Ramsay v. Tuthill Building Mate-
rial Co., 295 Ill. 395, 129 N.E. 127, 36 A.L.R. 23 (1920); Powers v. Harlow, 53 Mich. 507,
19 N.W. 257, 51 Am. Rep. 154 (1884); Mattson v. Minnesota & N.W. R.R., 95 Minn. 477,
104 N.W. 443, 70 L.R.A. 503, 111 Am. St. Rep. 483, 5 Ann. Cas. 498 (1905). Often courts,
even though they do not accept the attractive nuisance doctrine, realizing the neces-
sity of some increased protection to children-trespassers, allow recovery where
occupier is using and maintaining such ultra-hazardous agencies as explosives. Cole-
bank v. Nellie Coal and Coke Co., 106 W. Va. 402, 145 S.E. 748 (1928); Kingsland v.
Erie County Agricultural Soc., supra, this note; Travell v. Bannerman, 174 N.Y. 47, 66
N.E. 583 (1903).
Finally, some few courts still clinging to the theory that the occupier owes no
duty for such dangers to adults or children alike, and refusing the doctrine of attrac-
tive nuisance and anything smacking of it, refuse liability entirely. Bruso v. Eastern
States Exposition, 269 Mass. 21, 168 N.E. 206 (1929); Kidder v. Sadler, 117 Me. 194, 103
Atl. 159 (1918); Chicoine v. James E. Cashman, Inc., 108 Vt. 133, 183 AtI. 487 (1936).
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